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9:00 AM Bulgarian Elections 2026 - Whose Interests Are at Stake?

An analytical review of the presidential elections in Bulgaria, focusing not on personal rivalries but on the clash of structural interests. Internal clans, external players, corruption as a tool of control, and open questions without clear answers.<h2 class="ql-align-justify">Introduction: Eight Elections as Diagnosis</h2><p class="ql-align-justify">On October 25, 2026, Bulgaria is once again going to presidential elections. It seems like an ordinary event — democracy is working, citizens are voting. But behind this familiar picture lies something more troubling: the country has already held eight parliamentary elections since 2021. Eight times in five years, Bulgarians went to the polls in hope of change. Eight times the system reproduced itself.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">This is not a political crisis in the usual sense of the word. Political crises occur, get resolved, and leave some residue — new institutions, new rules, new players. What is happening in Bulgaria is structured differently. Here, the crisis has become the norm. Instability is not a temporary state, but a constant mode of operation.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Why? To answer this question, it is not enough to look at the personalities of the candidates or the programs of the parties. One must look deeper — at the structure of interests that lie behind the facade of Bulgarian democracy. At the internal clans that have controlled the courts, prosecution, and media for decades. At the external players — the EU, the USA, Russia — each of whom sees Bulgaria as their own tool. And at the corruption that plays a very specific governance function in this system.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">This article is an attempt at a cautious analytical look at what is happening. Not agitation and not accusations. Questions worth asking. A logic worth tracing. Conclusions are left to the reader.</p><h2 class="ql-align-justify">Section 1. Eight Elections: What It Says About the System</h2><p class="ql-align-justify">Let’s start with a simple fact. From 2021 to 2026, Bulgaria held eight parliamentary elections. For comparison: during the same period, Germany held one, France — two. Even Italy, which is considered a benchmark of political instability, held fewer.</p> <p class="ql-align-justify">Every electoral cycle was launched for the same reason: coalitions collapsed, governments fell, the parliament could not form a stable majority. The anti-corruption protests of 2020 gave a boost to new parties — they entered parliament, tried to change the system from within, and faced a wall. The GERB coalition with reformists disintegrated in 2023–2024 under the pressure of street protests — the largest in thirty years. Zhelyazkov's government resigned. The country was once again led to elections.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">What does this say about the system? At least three things.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">First: formal institutions do not function as a mechanism for reconciling interests. The parliament in a normal democracy is a platform where different groups negotiate. In Bulgaria, agreements cannot be reached not because politicians are especially principled, but because real agreements are made elsewhere — where there are no cameras and protocols.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Second: the voter is tired, but not utterly desperate. Turnout is falling, but people still come. This is an important nuance: complete apathy would perhaps have been a more honest response to what is happening. Instead — tired but stubborn participation. Bulgarian society is looking for a way out, does not find it, but does not stop searching.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Third: the system has a remarkable resilience to reforms. Every new "reformist" force, coming to power, discovered that the real levers of control — the courts, the prosecution, law enforcement agencies, large media — do not obey them. You can win elections. You cannot win the state.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">This is where the most interesting question begins: to whom does this state belong? Who really governs Bulgaria in the intervals between elections — and during them too?</p> <p class="ql-align-justify">The answer, as usual, is multilayered. There are internal structures — business clans that emerged from the privatization of the 1990s, mutated organized groups that have integrated into the legal economy, politicians who have long stopped distinguishing between party funds and state finances. And there are external interests — more systemic, more long-term, less noticeable in the daily political hustle.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">About them — in the following sections.</p><h2 class="ql-align-justify">Section 2. Candidates as Functions: Who Represents What</h2><p class="ql-align-justify">Presidential elections are usually discussed in terms of personalities. Biographies, characters, public statements. This is understandable — people vote for a specific person, not for an abstract structure of interests. But an analytical perspective requires a different question: not who these people are, but what they represent. What function does each candidate perform in the system that nominated them?</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Let's look at the main players precisely through this lens.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">Iliana Yotova: Continuity with a Human Face</h3><p class="ql-align-justify">The acting president of Bulgaria from January 2026 — when Rumen Radev leaves the post of head of state to head his own party and become prime minister. Yotova has been vice president for nine years, that is, all of Radev's presidency. She is his political continuation, although she officially runs from an initiative committee, not from a party.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">She is supported by: Radev's "Progressive Bulgaria" (which won the April elections with almost 44% of the votes), the Bulgarian Socialist Party, and the organization "Rise, Bulgaria". This is a broad coalition of left and left-center electorate with a strong nationalist tint — in terms of emphasis on "Bulgarian sovereignty" and skepticism towards Western institutions.</p> <p class="ql-align-justify">Her function in the system: legitimization of Radev's course through the presidential institution. The Prime Minister rules, the President creates a symbolic cover. If Yotova wins — the course towards "pragmatic neutrality" gains double institutional support: both the government and the presidency look in the same direction. This is the maximum concentration of power in one hand while formally adhering to the separation of powers.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Her rhetoric is cautious but consistent. Bulgaria should not be drawn into the war in Ukraine. The country will not join the "coalition of the willing." The European path — yes, but with "critical thinking and pragmatism." This is a language that simultaneously reassures Brussels partners and sends a signal to the domestic electorate: we are not anyone's puppet.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">How sincere this is — is an open question. How functional this is — is obvious.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">Andrey Gyurov: pro-European technocrat as an alternative</h3><p class="ql-align-justify">Former Vice Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, acting Prime Minister from February to May 2026. A man with a reputation as "clean" — with no obvious corruption history, without a vivid party past. That is why he was nominated by the pro-European opposition — the coalition "We Continue the Changes — Democratic Bulgaria."</p><p class="ql-align-justify">His support in polls is around 21–23%. This is a real but significantly smaller base compared to Yotova. The parties that support him garnered about 12% in the April parliamentary elections — three times less than "Progressive Bulgaria."</p> <p class="ql-align-justify">His function in the system: to provide the pro-European and liberal electorate with a candidate who is not compromised by previous coalition agreements with GERB (the party of long-time Prime Minister Borisov). Gyurov promises: Bulgaria will not leave Europe, 35 years of integration will not be overshadowed by "party, oligarchic, or foreign interests." The last phrasing is elegant: under "foreign interests," each listener understands what they want.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Gyurov's problem lies in his strength. The reputation of a "clean technocrat" is good for a banker. For a president, political will and the ability to withstand the system are needed. Whether he possesses these qualities is unknown. The system knows how to absorb technocrats just as well as populists.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">Konstantin Kostadinov: anger as a political resource</h3><p class="ql-align-justify">The leader of the "Revival" party is the Bulgarian version of right-wing nationalist populism. Anti-Western rhetoric, skepticism towards NATO, sympathies for "sovereignty" in the Hungarian-Orbán sense. In the April parliamentary elections, "Revival" garnered about 4% — the party has declined. However, in the presidential elections, the protest electorate behaves differently.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">His function: to absorb anger. The anger that has accumulated over eight electoral cycles, over years of promises and disappointments, over the feeling that the country is not governed for its citizens. Kostadinov does not offer a real alternative — he offers an emotion. And this, strangely enough, is more honest than many programmatic promises.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">He will enter the first round, but most likely not the second. However, his electorate in the second round becomes a resource. And how he manages it — whether he remains silent, calls for a boycott, or unexpectedly supports one of the favorites — can change the outcome. In general, this autumn may be rich in surprises...</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">Others: presence as a political gesture</h3> <p class="ql-align-justify">Dozens of other registered candidates — from 72-year-old economist Alexandar Tomov to professor of Japanese studies Nako Stefanov — serve a different function. They ensure representation on the ballot for those segments of the electorate that otherwise either would not come or would vote "against all." This is not a struggle for victory. This is a struggle for representation — small groups, marginal ideas, regional interests.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">In a country with a two-round system, where no one has ever won in the first round, the first round is a kind of sociological snapshot. The real struggle begins in the second.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">And here arises the next question: what lies behind these candidates at the level of real interests — internal and external? We will address this in the next section.</p><h2 class="ql-align-justify">Section 3. Inside the System: Clans, Courts, Money</h2><p class="ql-align-justify">Bulgarian privatization in the 1990s was rapid and opaque. Within a few years, state assets — factories, banks, land, media — passed into private hands at prices that had no relation to their real value. This is not a peculiar Bulgarian feature: similar processes occurred throughout the post-Soviet space. But in Bulgaria, they left an especially deep mark — a network of owners and beneficiaries that has since reproduced itself in every new political cycle.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">This network is commonly referred to as "oligarchy," although the word has already worn thin from usage. It would be more accurate to say: stable interest groups that control three key resources — money, information, and law.</p> <p class="ql-align-justify">Money is access to government contracts, EU subsidies, bank credit. Bulgaria has received tens of billions of euros in structural funds over its years of EU membership. A significant portion of this money has gone through schemes that Brussels periodically froze, investigated, and then unfroze. Politicians changed — the schemes remained.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Information is media. The Bulgarian media market is small and highly concentrated. A few large media groups are owned by people with obvious political and business interests. Independent journalism exists — in the form of small publications that are struggling for funding and facing constant pressure. A picture typical for countries with "captured" media.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Law is the prosecution and courts. This is the most important resource because it determines who is held accountable and who is not. The Bulgarian prosecutor's office has been a subject of scandals for years — not because prosecutors are particularly bad people, but because the institution is structured in such a way that the Chief Prosecutor is virtually unaccountable to anyone. This is not an accidental architectural error. It is a convenient construct.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">It is this construct that reformist parties, which entered parliament after 2020, tried to break. And it is here that they hit a wall. Constitutional amendments, judicial reform, a new law on the prosecutor's office — all of this stalled, was rewritten, and blocked. Not because the reformers were naive. But because the system resists not with arguments — it resists with resources.</p> <p class="ql-align-justify">The story of Boyko Borissov is indicative. Three-time prime minister, long-time leader of GERB — the party that has dominated Bulgarian politics for over ten years. Several criminal investigations, allegations of corruption, European reports with names and figures. And yet — a sustainable political presence, a parliamentary faction, real influence. This is not an anomaly. This is the normal functioning of a system where the law is used selectively.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">It is important to understand: this system is not monolithic. Inside it, there is a constant struggle between groups — for contracts, for media influence, for access to new streams of European funding. Elections are one of the tools of this struggle. Parties in Bulgaria are often created not to implement a program, but to have a seat at the negotiating table. Political competition — yes. Only the ideas do not compete.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">An external observer sees chaos: eight elections, changing coalitions, constant scandals. An internal observer — someone who lives in this country — sees something different: beneath the chaos there is stability. The same people, the same money, the same mechanisms. Chaos at the top — order at the bottom, at the foundation.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">This is the main question for any presidential election: is the new president able to change something in this foundation? Or is his role to legitimize the system, giving it a human face for the next five years?</p><h2 class="ql-align-justify">Section 4. External players: the EU and the USA — allies with different maps</h2> <p class="ql-align-justify">Bulgaria joined NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007. Since then, it is commonly believed that the country has a "western vector" — unified, monolithic, directed in one direction. This is a convenient simplification. In practice, the term "West" hides two different actors with different interests, different time horizons, and different instruments of influence. And Bulgaria is one of the points where these interests diverge.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">Brussels: Manageability as a Value</h3><p class="ql-align-justify">The European Union wants predictability from Bulgaria. Not democracy in the ideal sense — but a functioning member that adheres to the rules of the single market, meets budgetary commitments, and does not create precedents that undermine the overall structure.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Bulgaria has long irritated Brussels. Corruption, a weak judiciary system, problems with the rule of law — all of this has been noted in the European Commission's reports for years. In 2022, Bulgaria was still under a monitoring mechanism introduced at the time of joining the EU in 2007 — an unprecedentedly long time. This is not just bureaucratic dissatisfaction. It is a signal: the country does not meet the basic conditions of membership.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">At the same time, Brussels is not interested in destabilization. Hungary showed that open conflict with a member state comes at a high cost — politically, legally, and reputationally. Therefore, the EU's tools are pressure through funding (freezing of funds), pressure through procedures (the deficient procedure that Bulgaria is currently undergoing), and pressure through reports and ratings. Slowly, ineffectively — but there are no other options.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">A candidate who is convenient for Brussels is one who speaks the language of European values, does not create scandals at summits, and does not block common decisions. Gyurov, in this sense, is a comfortable figure. Yotova, with her rhetoric of "neutrality" and "pragmatism," is less comfortable, although not hostile.</p> <h3 class="ql-align-justify">Washington: geography is destiny</h3><p class="ql-align-justify">The USA views Bulgaria differently. Not through the lens of the rule of law or fiscal discipline — but through the lens of a map. The Black Sea region has acquired strategic significance after 2022 that it has not had for decades. Bulgaria is the only NATO member with access to the Black Sea, besides Romania and Turkey. Graf Ignatievo and Bezmer airbases are used by the alliance. The port of Varna is a logistical hub.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">For Washington, the key question is not "how honest are Bulgarian elections," but "will the next government be a reliable ally." Reliability in American understanding means voting in NATO, access to bases, willingness to accept military equipment, and participate in exercises. Historically, the U.S. has turned a blind eye to domestic corruption as long as the ally is geopolitically loyal.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Radev annoys Washington precisely because he violates this loyalty. Skepticism towards sanctions against Russia, rhetoric about "neutrality," resistance to supplying arms to Ukraine — all of this is perceived not as Bulgarian sovereignty but as unreliability. The label "pro-Russian" immediately appears — a standard tool for discrediting any deviation from the course.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Yotova, as a continuation of Radev — accordingly, is also a source of concern for Washington. Gyurov, with his pro-European rhetoric and banking background, is a more predictable figure in American understanding of stability.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">Where interests diverge</h3><p class="ql-align-justify">Here lies the contradiction that is rarely spoken aloud. A candidate who is most convenient for Brussels is not necessarily the most convenient for Washington — and vice versa.</p> <p class="ql-align-justify">The EU wants reforms within the country — independent courts, transparent tenders, a functioning prosecutor's office. This threatens the internal clans that have been convenient partners for American business and American intelligence services for decades. A truly independent prosecutor's office could uncover schemes involving not only Bulgarian politicians.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">The USA wants geopolitical loyalty. But a loyal state is not necessarily a reformed one. Often, it's the opposite: corrupt elites are easier to manage because they are vulnerable. They have compromising materials, they depend on external protection, there is a price for loyalty.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">This is classic colonial mechanics. Metropolises do not need a healthy state on the periphery — a healthy state begins to assert its own interests. A manageable state is needed. Corruption in this logic is not a problem to be solved. It is a tool that needs to be kept operational.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Bulgarian voters feel this intuitively, even without articulating it in such terms. Hence the fatigue. Hence the feeling that any candidate, whoever he may be, is embedded in a system that is larger than him. Hence the declining turnout and the growing protest electorate.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">The next question: what about Russia? Its interest in the Bulgarian elections is obvious — or not?</p><h2 class="ql-align-justify">Section 5. Russia and the Black Sea factor: real influence and a convenient myth</h2><p class="ql-align-justify">When a Bulgarian politician speaks about "sovereignty" or "neutrality" — Western press almost reflexively adds: "pro-Russian." This is a convenient label. It frees one from the necessity of understanding what exactly lies behind a specific person's position — real dependence on Moscow, electoral calculation, genuine skepticism towards Western institutions, or simply a different assessment of national interests.</p> <p class="ql-align-justify">Let's analyze what is real in the Bulgarian case and what is a construct.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">Real influence</h3><p class="ql-align-justify">Energy dependence is a fact. Bulgaria has been importing Russian gas and oil for decades. Lukoil owned the largest oil refinery in the Balkans — in Burgas. After 2022, the pressure for diversification intensified, American LNG gradually entered the market, but complete independence is years and billions of investments away, which are currently lacking.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Cultural and historical ties are also a fact. Bulgaria owes its liberation from Ottoman rule in 1878 to Russia. Orthodoxy, Cyrillic, common Slavic identity — this is not propaganda, it is a real cultural substrate that exists independently of political conjuncture. Part of Bulgarian society views Russia with sympathy — not because they watch RT, but because they were raised that way.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Finally, business ties. Russian business was present in Bulgaria through chains of intermediaries — in energy, real estate, and finance. After the sanctions of 2022, some of these ties went underground, but did not disappear. Money has no nationality — it seeks routes.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">Convenient myth</h3><p class="ql-align-justify">At the same time, "pro-Russian Bulgaria" as a stable political construct is largely a myth that serves several interests at once.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">For Moscow, it is beneficial to have a reputation of influence in a NATO country — even if the real influence is less than it seems. This creates uncertainty, forces allies to spend resources on monitoring and pressure, and provides a trump card in the information war.</p> <p class="ql-align-justify">For Western capitals, the label "pro-Russian" is a convenient tool for discipline. Any deviation from the agreed course — whether skepticism about arms supplies or a demand to consider national economic interests — can be neutralized by attaching this label. Substantive discussion becomes unnecessary.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">For the Bulgarian opposition, accusing the authorities of "working for Moscow" is an effective electoral tactic. It is difficult to prove, equally difficult to refute, but it works well in the media.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">As a result, the real question — what are Bulgaria's national interests and how to reconcile them with allied obligations — is pushed out of the public space. Instead, there is a war of labels.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">The Black Sea Factor: Why the Stakes Have Increased</h3><p class="ql-align-justify">After February 2022, the Black Sea ceased to be a regional issue. It has become a frontier of global confrontation. Ukrainian drones are attacking Russian ships. Russia is blocking Ukrainian grain exports. Turkey is balancing between the two sides, controlling the Bosporus. In this configuration, Bulgaria is not a neutral observer. It is a NATO member with bases, ports, and airspace that have direct military significance.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">This means that the presidential elections in Bulgaria are not purely an internal affair. The outcome will affect how the country behaves in NATO, how freely the alliance will use Bulgarian infrastructure, how Bulgaria will vote on the next sanctions package or the next decision on military aid to Ukraine.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Yotova has already said: Bulgaria will not join the "coalition of the willing." These are not just words — this is a signal that has been heard in Washington, London, and Paris. Gyurov sent an opposite signal: the European path, allied commitments, no drifting.</p> <p class="ql-align-justify">Two signals — two different futures for Bulgarian participation in the Black Sea configuration. That is why these elections are interesting not only for Bulgarian voters.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">What remains behind the scenes</h3><p class="ql-align-justify">Behind the scenes, there remains one uncomfortable question: what is beneficial for Bulgaria itself — not as a NATO member, not as an EU member, but as a country with specific citizens, a specific economy, and specific problems?</p><p class="ql-align-justify">The answer to this question is hardly heard in the election debates. Geopolitics pushes aside internal issues. Candidates talk about the war in Ukraine, about the European path, about sovereignty — but not about why Bulgarian youth continue to leave, why healthcare is deteriorating, why poverty in the EU country remains one of the highest in the union.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">This is also part of the system. While the voter thinks about geopolitics — they do not think about who and how distributes European funds within the country.</p><h2 class="ql-align-justify">Section 6. Corruption as an instrument: colonial classic</h2><p class="ql-align-justify">The word "corruption" in public discourse is used as a moral category. Corruption is bad, it must be fought against, the guilty must be punished. This is true. But it is an incomplete truth. Because corruption is also a systemic tool that performs quite specific management functions. And to understand why it is so difficult to fight against it, one can only look at it not as a moral flaw, but as a mechanism.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">The mechanism works on two levels — internal and external.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">Internal level: vertical of loyalty</h3> <p class="ql-align-justify">Within the country, corruption creates a vertical of loyalty that is more effective than any party discipline. A judge who got the position through the right person depends on that person — not because he fears exposure today, but because his entire career trajectory is embedded in a system of mutual services. A prosecutor who closed a case for a reward becomes vulnerable — and therefore manageable. A mayor who won a tender for the right company is embedded in a chain that will protect him as long as he performs his function.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">This is not chaos. This is order — only invisible to an outside observer. Formal institutions — parliament, government, courts — become a facade. Real decisions are made elsewhere, according to different rules.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">A reformer who comes into this system with the intention to change it faces not the resistance of evil people. He faces the resistance of a structure in which each participant has a personal interest in its preservation. A judge does not want independence — he wants the security provided by dependence. An official does not want transparent tenders — he wants predictable income provided by non-transparent ones.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">This is why anti-corruption reforms are stalled not only in Bulgaria — everywhere that corruption has reached a systemic level. Fighting it with laws is like treating a symptom without addressing the cause.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">External level: managed periphery</h3><p class="ql-align-justify">The external level is a more delicate topic, but no less real.</p> <p class="ql-align-justify">Historically, metropolises—be it colonial empires of the 19th century or geopolitical blocks of the 20th—have found that a corrupt elite on the periphery is more convenient than an uncorrupted one. An uncorrupted elite has moral authority, relies on popular support, and is capable of defending national interests. The corrupt one is vulnerable. They have accounts in foreign banks, business in foreign jurisdictions, children in foreign universities. All of this is leverage.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">One should not think that this works through direct instructions from some center. The mechanism is more subtle. Western financial institutions have been accepting Bulgarian money of questionable origin for decades—while political loyalty from Sofia did not raise any questions. European funds flowed through schemes that were best left unknown in Brussels—as long as Bulgaria voted correctly. American partners worked with Bulgarian security officials, asking no unnecessary questions about their methods—as long as the bases were accessible.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">This is not a conspiracy. It is the rational behavior of system participants, each pursuing their own interests. The result is an unspoken agreement: we do not interfere with you stealing internally, you do not interfere with us using you externally.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Bulgaria in this scheme is not an exception. It is a typical case of what political scientists call a "captured state" on the periphery of a geopolitical block. There are dozens of such cases in history. The mechanics are the same everywhere.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">Why this is important for elections</h3><p class="ql-align-justify">Because any candidate who truly threatens this system—the internal vertical of loyalty and the external unspoken agreement simultaneously—faces resistance from two sides. From within, they are drowned by their own. From the outside, they are discredited by others.</p> <p class="ql-align-justify">A candidate who threatens only one side — either a reformer without external support or a nationalist without an internal base — is doomed to marginality or absorption.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Sustainable change is possible only when the internal demand for reform aligns with the external interest in it. In the Bulgarian case, this alignment is currently absent. The EU wants reforms — but not so much as to pay the political price for them. The US wants loyalty — but not so much as to sacrifice the convenience of a managed elite for the discomfort of independence.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">In this gap exists Bulgarian politics. Eight elections — and the system remains in place.</p><h2 class="ql-align-justify">Section 7. What could change — and why it is likely not to change</h2><p class="ql-align-justify">This question is asked after every Bulgarian election. And each time the answer turns out to be roughly the same. Not because Bulgarians are particularly passive or particularly corrupt — but because the logic of the system is stronger than the logic of individual people within it.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">But let's honestly examine: what could theoretically change and under what conditions.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">The president in the Bulgarian system: real powers</h3><p class="ql-align-justify">Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic. The president does not rule. He does not appoint ministers at his discretion, does not control the budget, does not command the special services in an operational sense. His powers are representative, symbolic, and in some cases blocking: a veto on laws (which parliament can override), appointing caretaker governments during transitional periods, and the role of commander-in-chief in a constitutional, rather than actual, sense.</p> <p class="ql-align-justify">This means that the president alone cannot reform the courts, disperse the corrupt prosecution, or redistribute European funds. Real power lies with the government and the parliamentary majority. Right now, it is Rumen Radev and his "Progressive Bulgaria".</p><p class="ql-align-justify">So why are presidential elections so important at all - if the president has little real power?</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Because the president is a voice. A public position that is difficult to silence. A moral authority or its absence. The ability to veto at the right moment and slow down the process for months - sometimes this is critically important. And finally - a symbol of which way the country is looking. In geopolitically turbulent times, symbols carry weight.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">Scenario one: Yotova wins</h3><p class="ql-align-justify">The most likely outcome. Radev's government and Yotova's presidency represent a unified camp, a unified signal to the outside. Bulgaria consolidates around the course of "pragmatic sovereignty": formally in the EU and NATO, but in reality - with maximum autonomy on sensitive issues, primarily regarding Ukraine.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">What does this mean internally? Probably - the continuation of the status quo. There will be no reform of the judicial system: Radev has no political interest in them, quite the opposite. European funds will flow through the same channels. The media space will remain concentrated. Young people will continue to leave.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">What does this mean externally? Tension with Washington and part of Brussels. Bulgaria becomes yet another friction point within NATO - following Hungary, albeit with different rhetoric. This is not an exit from the alliance - it is constant friction that wears out all participants.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">Scenario two: Gyurov wins</h3> <p class="ql-align-justify">Less likely, but not impossible. If the pro-European electorate mobilizes, if Kostadinov goes into the shadows in the second round or calls for a boycott, if the fatigue from Radev proves stronger than the fatigue from the opposition — Gyurov passes.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">What changes? Symbolically — a lot. Bulgaria is again clearly turning towards Brussels and Washington. The rhetoric is changing. The international image — too.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">What does not change? The government remains Radev's. The parliamentary majority is the same. The courts — the same. The schemes — the same. President Gyurov will work under conditions of intense conflict with the executive power — somewhat like Radev did in his early years when Borisov was Prime Minister. This is a period of permanent confrontation, institutional blockages, and media wars.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Will anything significant change for the ordinary Bulgarian? Unlikely. Reforms require a parliamentary majority, political will, and time. None of this will be available to Gyurov.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">Why the system reproduces itself</h3><p class="ql-align-justify">There is a temptation to explain the resilience of the Bulgarian system by malicious intent — specific people who consciously guard it. This is partially true. But the main reason runs deeper.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">The system reproduces itself because it is not only those at the top who are interested in it. A district court judge in a provincial town, receiving a small bonus for the right decisions, is not an oligarch. A bureaucrat helping a local entrepreneur circumvent tender requirements for a modest reward is not a mafia member. They are just people embedded in a system of incentives that makes honest behavior unprofitable and dishonest — normal.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Changing the system of incentives is a task not for one election and not for one presidential term. It is the work of generations, if it is even possible without an external shock of sufficient strength.</p> <p class="ql-align-justify">External shocks come in different forms. Sometimes it is war nearby — like in 2022. Sometimes it is an economic collapse. Sometimes — mass protests reaching a critical mass. Bulgaria experienced the protests of 2020, which seemed to be such a shock. The system absorbed them — not suppressed them by force, but rather absorbed: partly included new participants, partly discredited them from within, partly just outwaited them.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">This is the highest class of resilience. Not rigidity, but flexibility. Not a wall, but a swamp.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">Is there a basis for cautious optimism</h3><p class="ql-align-justify">The honest answer: a little. But there is.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Bulgarian civil society is alive. Independent journalism exists — small, underfunded, but it exists. Young lawyers, judges, prosecutors who entered the system with different values — there are some. They are few, they work in a hostile environment, but they are there.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">The European Union, despite its slowness, is still exerting pressure. Deficit procedures, freezing of funds, public reports — this is not nothing. Slowly, but the pressure is building up.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">And finally — demographics. Bulgarians who left for Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain in the last twenty years are returning — not all, but some. They have seen how other systems work. They have different expectations from the state. This is not a revolutionary force — but it is a slow change in the social fabric.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Is this enough? No. But it would also be dishonest to deny these processes.</p><h2 class="ql-align-justify">Section 8. Open questions: without ready answers</h2><p class="ql-align-justify">On October 25, Bulgarians will go to the polls. Some of them — with hope, some — out of habit, some — from principle. A significant part will not come at all. And this is also a choice, although it is not usually considered as such.</p> <p class="ql-align-justify">This article does not advocate for anyone. Not because the author doesn't care — but because advocating in this case would be intellectually dishonest. The system we described in previous sections is arranged in such a way that a specific winner changes less than is commonly thought. This is not a reason for apathy — it is a reason for clarity.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Instead of conclusions — a few questions that seem important. Not rhetorical. Real.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">The first question: where is the line between sovereignty and isolation</h3><p class="ql-align-justify">The rhetoric of “sovereignty” sounds persuasive — especially against the backdrop of the obvious external pressure on Bulgarian politics. But sovereignty is not an abstraction. It is the ability to make decisions in national interests and to be accountable for them. The question is whether the current Bulgarian elite — any part of it — has a real concept of these interests. Or is “sovereignty” just a convenient word to avoid making uncomfortable choices.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Orban's Hungary is an example of sovereignism taken to its logical conclusion. The result: a country within the EU that systematically blocks common decisions, receives billions of European money, and at the same time builds a regime incompatible with the declared values of the union. Is this sovereignty — or parasitism under a nationalist flag? Bulgaria is not Hungary. But the question needs to be asked.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">The second question: who pays for geopolitics</h3><p class="ql-align-justify">The geopolitical turbulence around Bulgaria has a very specific economic cost. Sanctions against Russia hit Bulgarian exporters. Energy diversification costs money, which is ultimately paid by the consumer. Military spending is a budget item that is growing at the expense of other items.</p> <p class="ql-align-justify">Who bears this cost? Not the politicians, who discuss sovereignty and the European path. Not the media group owners, who publish editorials about national interests. It is borne by people with specific salaries and specific utility bills. This is not an argument against geopolitics — it is an argument for honesty in discussing its cost.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">Third question: is reform possible from within</h3><p class="ql-align-justify">History has examples of systems that reformed themselves from within — slowly, painfully, but truly. Spain after Franco. Poland after communism. South Korea after decades of military dictatorships. None of these transformations were linear and none were without external pressure — but the momentum came from within.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Is there enough internal momentum in Bulgaria? The protests of 2020 showed that civic energy exists. But they also demonstrated that this energy is insufficient to break the system without institutional support. Reformist parties received institutional support — and found that the system absorbs them faster than they can change it.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Perhaps the question is poorly formulated. Not “is reform possible from within,” but “what type of reform is possible and in what timeframe.” There is no answer — but the question should be kept open.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">Fourth question: what is a normal state</h3><p class="ql-align-justify">This is the most uncomfortable question. Because it suggests that we have a clear idea of what a state should be — and that idea varies among different people.</p> <p class="ql-align-justify">For some, a normal state is an effective EU member with independent courts and transparent tenders. For others, it is a state that primarily protects its citizens from external pressure, even at the cost of some internal compromises. For a third group, it is a state that leaves people alone and does not interfere with their lives.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Bulgarian elections are, among other things, a vote for different versions of this answer. The trouble is that none of the candidates formulates it honestly. They speak in the language of geopolitics and European values—because it is safer than speaking in the language of the real interests of real people.</p><h3 class="ql-align-justify">In conclusion</h3><p class="ql-align-justify">On October 15, 2026—two weeks after the publication of this article—Bulgarians will vote. Whoever wins, the system will continue to operate according to its own logic. The courts will remain as they are. Money will flow where it always has. Young Bulgarians will look at the map of Europe and calculate routes.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">But elections still matter. Not because one president can change the system—but because they fix a moment. They show what society thinks of itself, its place, and its limits of patience. This is not nothing.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Sobriety is not the same as cynicism. Understanding the limitations of the system while not giving up is perhaps the only workable position for someone who wants to think, rather than just choose between labels.</p><p class="ql-align-justify">Thinking is useful.</p><p class="ql-align-justify"><em>© Lesnoy, October 10, 2026</em></p><p class="ql-align-justify">translation © lesnoy</p><p>© lesnoy, LifeArmy.org</p><p>Original: <a href="https://lifearmy.org/articles/bulgarian-elections-2026-interests">https://lifearmy.org/articles/bulgarian-elections-2026-interests</a></p>

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